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Not even ten years ago, James Markusen’s well-
known survey on the motives for multinational
firms to invest abroad concluded that “(t)here is
little support for the idea that risk diversification
or tax avoidance are important motives for direct
foreign investment” (Markusen 1995, p. 171).
Meanwhile, the evaluation of the importance of
taxes as a determinant for foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) has changed markedly. Following
extensive theoretical research on tax competition
for internationally mobile capital1 a substantial
body of empirical work has appeared in recent
years which almost unanimously concludes that
high taxes have a significantly negative effect on
the likelihood of a country to attract FDI. Many of
the empirical contributions have explored the
determinants of US outward and inward foreign
direct investment (see Hines 1999 for an
overview),but recently there have also been sever-
al studies that analyze the location decisions of
EU-based multinationals within Europe (De
Mooij and Ederveen 2001).
The increasing policy interest in the link between
taxes and FDI results from high unemployment in
Europe, which governments hope to alleviate by
attracting sufficiently large FDI inflows.Moreover,
it is widely believed that FDI inflows into a coun-
try have positive productivity spillovers on domes-
tic firms, and this proposition is generally support-
ed by the existing econometric evidence (Görg and
Strobl 2001). Taken together these presumably
positive effects of FDI are able to explain the
increasing willingness of potential host countries to
grant tax breaks or outright subsidies to multina-
tional firms that open up a new plant in their juris-
diction. At the same time, however, there is
increasing concern both among academics and pol-
icymakers that multinational firms avoid taxes
unduly through strategic tax planning and profit
shifting to low-tax countries.2
In this research report we argue that the complex
links between FDI and the tax systems of alterna-
tive host countries require a disaggregated empiri-
cal analysis that carefully distinguishes between
different sectors in which FDI takes place, and
between different motives for undertaking the
investment. The results that have so far been
obtained in the research project3 indicate that
investments undertaken in different sectors of the
economy respond with very different elasticities to
tax incentives (Stöwhase 2003). Moreover, an FDI
activity undertaken for the purpose of production
responds to a broad range of tax incentives where-
as an FDI activity whose primary purpose is to sup-
ply internal services to the multinational enterprise
(MNE) responds primarily to the statutory tax rate
(Stöwhase 2002).This last finding is consistent with
international profit shifting and it also demon-
strates the need to distinguish between different
measures of the tax burden in a given host country.
Alternative tax rate measures 
The natural starting point for a discussion of mea-
sures of corporate taxation is the statutory tax rate
on corporate profits, summed over different levels
of government in a given country. A major advan-
tage of statutory tax rates is that data are readily
available, both over time and across countries.
However,statutory tax rates include neither differ-
ent depreciation allowances nor any other specifics
of the national tax codes and are therefore only a
very incomplete measure of the tax incentives
faced by multinational firms.4
More encompassing tax measures are so-called
effective tax rates. Broadly speaking, effective tax
rates take into account the differences between the
theoretical concept of pure economic profits and
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This will be further discussed below.the taxable income on which firms are actually
charged under the tax code of a given country. In
the presence of special tax breaks, accelerated
depreciation schemes and similar tax incentives,
taxable profits may be substantially lower than
pure economic profits, leading to diverging mea-
sures for statutory tax rates on the one hand and
effective tax rates on the other.
Effective tax rates can be divided into two cate-
gories, backward and forward looking tax mea-
sures. Backward looking tax measures use histori-
cal information about past profits and paid taxes to
compute effective tax rates. Mendoza et al. (1994)
divide total tax revenue from corporate income by
the reported surplus of the economy in any given
year to estimate a macroeconomic effective aver-
age tax rate, which is also referred to as an implic-
it tax rate. Analogously, it is possible to derive
microeconomic tax rates for individual firms using
actual tax payments and accounting data. These
firm-level data can then be aggregated to obtain
microeconomic effective average tax rates for one
or several industries.
Forward-looking measures of effective tax burdens
consider expected tax payments associated with
particular decisions made by the firm. King and
Fullerton (1984) were the first who computed
effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) with an
approach based on neo-classical investment theo-
ry. Given the tax code of a country and the interest
rate, they calculate the pre-tax rate of return of a
(hypothetical) marginal investment project that is
required to earn an after-tax return equal to the
interest rate.The EMTR is then defined as the dif-
ference between the required pre-tax rate of
return and the interest rate (the so-called “tax
wedge”), divided by the pre-tax rate of return.
By construction, the EMTR is especially relevant
when analysing the effects of taxes on incremental
investment decisions, for example plant expan-
sions. It fails, however, to capture the effects of
intra-marginal investments like the location deci-
sion of a multinational corporation. Devereux and
Griffith (1998a, 1998b) have therefore extended
the King-Fullerton methodology to account for
discrete investment choices. This results in effec-
tive average tax rates (EATR), which can be
roughly described as a weighted average of the
EMTR on the one hand and the statutory tax rate
on the other. A final, and methodologically differ-
ent, instrument to calculate forward-looking tax
measures is the European Tax Analyzer (ETA; see
Jacobs and Spengel 1999). The ETA computes the
tax burden of a model firm by simultaneously sim-
ulating all decisions of the firm, including produc-
tion and financial planning, and is therefore some-
what closer to industrial management.
Table 1 shows the ranking of nine EU countries
under different measures of corporate taxation.5
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[1] – [4] (%)
Maximum of
[1] – [4] (%)
Austria 2 1 3 3 3 3  (34 %) 10.3  (micro) 27.9 (ETA)
Belgium 7 2 9 7 7 8  (40.2 %) 20.6  (micro) 34.5 (ETA)
France 5 7 5 8 5 6 (36.4 %) 23.6  (macro) 34.7 (ETA)
Germany 3 8 8 9 8 7 (38.3 %) 19.9  (macro) 34.9 (ETA)
Ireland 1 3 1 1 1 1  (28/10
* %) 8.0  (EATR) 23.5 (micro)
Italy 8 9 4 2 2 9   (40.3 %) 27.6 (ETA) 43.9 (micro)
Netherlands 6 6 6 5 6 4  (35 %) 24.7  (macro) 31.0 (ETA)
Spain 4 4 7 5 9 4 (35 %) 20.6  (macro) 32.5  (EATR)
UK 9 5 2 3 4 2  (30  %) 25.7 (EATR) 38.4 (macro)
* Split tax rate
a) = Macroeconomic tax rates based on a modified version of Mendoza et al. (1994) methodology. Source: OECD
(2000, p. 31). – 
b) = Microeconomic tax rates based on firm level data. Source: CPB – Netherlands' Bureau for
Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague. – 
c) = Effective average and effective marginal tax rates – base case. Source:
Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. – 
d) = Effective average tax rates computed by the European Tax Analyzer.
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2001, p. 202).
5The development of (different measures of) corporate taxation in
the period 1982-2001 is summarized and discussed in Devereux,
Griffith and Klemm (2002).CESifo DICE Report 2/2003 47
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Rank one is given to the country with the lowest
tax rate in the sample while rank nine labels the
country with the highest tax rate. As can be seen,
tax rates and the ranking of countries differ
markedly with the underlying tax measure. One
obvious case is Germany where the average tax
rate based on the backward-looking macroeco-
nomic approach is about 20 per cent, whereas the
effective average tax burden calculated from the
European Tax Analyzer is 15 percentage points
higher (34.9 percent). These differences are the
basis for the controversial discussion of whether
Germany is a high-tax country for corporations, or
not.6 The reverse pattern can be found in the
United Kingdom, where the tax rate on a hypo-
thetical investment project is rather low when
compared to other countries, but the macroeco-
nomic effective average tax rate is the highest in
our sample. There are a few countries which are
ranked consistently under each of the different tax
measures, such as Ireland and Austria (as low-tax
countries), or the Netherlands (as an intermediate-
tax country). However, for most countries in the
sample the evaluation of its tax burden, relative to
its neighbours, depends critically on the precise tax
measure used.
Taxes and FDI: The need for disaggregation
There are by now a great number of studies explor-
ing the determinants of US outward and inward
foreign direct investment (see Hines 1999). In con-
trast,there are still only a few analyses which focus
on the location decision of EU-based firms inside
Europe.Three examples of the latter are Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2000) and Büttner (2002), who use
foreign direct investment flows as dependent vari-
able, and Gorter and Parikh (2001), who measure
the impact of taxes on the stock of foreign direct
investment. Although the econometric models are
specified differently, all these studies find a signifi-
cantly negative correlation between tax rates and
foreign direct investment on the basis of bilateral
country-to-country data. Hence, the studies focus-
ing on the distribution of FDI inside Europe gen-
erally confirm the result of earlier US studies that
high taxes tend to deter foreign investment.
Beyond this general result, however, few conclu-
sions are possible at this point.A severe constraint
for empirical work on FDI in Europe is data avail-
ability. Almost all existing studies on FDI in
Europe rely on aggregated data, which are collect-
ed at the national level by the OECD and EURO-
STAT. Since the underlying national statistics are
generally not harmonized, this raises the problem
of data comparability. Moreover, FDI is a very het-
erogeneous measure and using aggregate data for
the relationship between taxes and FDI cannot
answer the question whether some types of FDI,or
some sectors in which FDI takes place, are more
sensitive to tax differences than others.
For the United States,where data is often available
at the firm level, there are several studies docu-
menting the importance of a disaggregated
approach. In an early study, Papke (1991) analyses
the relation between state tax rates and new firm
births in five distinct industries of the US manu-
facturing sector. While a negative correlation
between taxes and new firm births is confirmed,on
average, in his pooled sample, the five industries
under consideration differ markedly in their
response to tax rates, indicating a strong variance
in the mobility of capital between the different
industries. More recently, Swenson (2001) finds
that although tax rates are generally negatively
related to FDI, the tax-sensitivity depends crucial-
ly on the type of FDI. Analysing FDI into the
United States, her results indicate that new plants
and plant expansions appear to be deterred by high
state taxes, while mergers and acquisitions are
instead positively correlated with tax rates.
This more complex, but also more insightful, rela-
tionship between an appropriate tax measure and
sector or transaction-specific FDI is the starting
point for the empirical research project on which
we report here. Stöwhase (2003) follows the disag-
gregated approach using sector specific data about
outward foreign direct investment flows from
Germany, the UK and the Netherlands into eight
European countries for the years 1995 to 1999.This
data set is constructed from EUROSTAT figures.
EUROSTAT has been able to extend and improve
the coverage of FDI flows throughout the last two
years and can now provide more detailed data in
some areas. However, the sample size is rather
small so that results should be interpreted with due
caution.The basic approach of this study is to sep-
arately estimate tax-elasticities for the primary,
secondary and tertiary sector based on the assump-
tion that differences in location factors determine
6 See the debate between Hettich and Schmidt (2001, 2003) and
Gutekunst, Hermann and Lammersen (2003).the decision of an MNE where to invest (see
Dunning 1977; 1981). Thereby, the study controls
for differences in market size and factor costs
between host countries, and it also takes into
account pairwise fixed effects between the source
and the target country of the investment.7 The
study uses backward-looking microeconomic effec-
tive tax rates. The advantage of backward-looking
tax measures is that these rates have been empiri-
cally observed, rather than theoretically derived.
Additionally, focusing only on the tax payments of
local firms overcomes the problem that backward-
looking tax measures may be biased by cross-bor-
der profit shifting of MNEs.
The results of this study can be summarized as fol-
lows: (i) FDI in the primary sector (consisting of
agriculture, fishing, mining and quarrying) has a
tax elasticity of around zero, implying that FDI is
not driven by tax incentives. (ii) Investment in the
secondary sector (manufacturing) is negatively and
significantly affected by an increase in effective
taxation. The tax elasticity is around – 2, implying
that a one percent increase in the tax rate of the
host country decreases FDI by roughly two per-
cent. (iii) Compared to the secondary sector, FDI
in the tertiary sector (consisting of investment in
service industries such as transport, communica-
tion and financial intermediation) is even more
strongly affected by an increase in tax rates and the
tax elasticity for this sector is around – 3.
By weighing sector-specific elasticities with the
sector’s share of total FDI, we obtain an average
tax-elasticity of – 2.5. This average tax elasticity is
comparable to the results derived in more aggre-
gated studies.8 The results of the analysis are
graphically summarized in Figure 1.
What are the policy implications of obtaining sep-
arate tax elasticities for the three sectors? When
setting their tax rates, governments have to take
into account the effects of FDI on the local econo-
my. The spillovers most often mentioned are
increased demand for labour in the presence of
involuntary unemployment, and increases in pro-
ductivity that affect long-term economic growth.
Empirically, the existence of positive spillovers is
well documented (see Görg and Strobl 2001).Even
though empirical work on the possible transmis-
sion channels for these spillovers has only just
begun9, most observers argue that investments in
the primary sector have fewer positive spillovers
onto the rest of the economy than FDI in the other
sectors, and that technological spillovers are par-
ticularly high in the service sector. Using an undif-
ferentiated elasticity as the basis for tax planning
may therefore underestimate the gains from
attracting FDI, given the above-average tax elas-
ticity of the sectors which are likely to produce
most positive spillovers.10
Disaggregated FDI and its sensitivity to
tax burden measures
As pointed out above, the question of whether a
given host country is an attractive location for FDI
with respect to its corporate tax system will general-
ly depend on the precise measure of the capital tax
burden used.We have also seen that even if a unique
tax measure is used, the response of FDI to tax rate
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7 Pairwise fixed effects capture the specific relation between two
countries and include so called “weak” factors, such as culture and
language, which are hard to measure empirically.
8 De Mooij and Ederveen (2001) make the outcomes of several
empirical studies comparable and compute a mean tax-elasticity
around – 3.3.
Figure 1
9 Görg and Strobl (2002), for example, find empirical evidence that
positive spillovers from FDI to the local economy are transmitted
through worker mobility.
10 This can be important in studies that quantitatively compare the
tax concessions or subsidy payments granted to multinationals to the
benefits for the host country in terms of additional employment or
productivity spillovers. Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002) make a
first attempt in this direction and find that the British government
has “oversubsidized” FDI in some recent high-profile cases.CESifo DICE Report 2/2003 49
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differentials may differ across economic sectors.
Taken together, these two results raise the further
question of whether different types of FDI respond
in different ways to alternative tax measures.
We have pursued this issue in a separate study
(Stöwhase 2002), which divides FDI into two cate-
gories, labelled “production” and “services”. This
study employs the database “Globalisation” col-
lected by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Institut for
Economic Research (RWI, see Döhrn 2001). Our
dataset covers foreign activities of German multi-
nationals in eight European countries11 for the
years 1991 to 1998 leaving us with a rather small
sample size. The advantage of this database is that
it is possible to distinguish between the economic
functions of the activity so that we can divide FDI
into investment intended to produce final or inter-
mediate goods and investment intended to provide
the German parent with overhead services (such as
financial intermediation, or research and develop-
ment). An effective tax rate based on microeco-
nomic data and the statutory tax rate are taken as
tax parameters.Again, we run separate regressions
for the two categories of FDI.
The basic results of the two regressions are pre-
sented in Table 2. The coefficient of the effective
tax rate shows a negative sign for FDI in produc-
tion, but it is not significantly different from zero
for investment that falls into the service category.
This implies that an increase in the effective aver-
age tax rate decreases FDI in production facilities
but it does not affect FDI undertaken to provide
internal services to the MNE. Interestingly, we
observe precisely the opposite results for the statu-
tory tax rate. Here, FDI in production facilities
seems to be independent of the statutory tax rate,
whereas investment in the service category is
deterred by a higher statutory tax rate.
We can conclude from these findings that the two
types of FDI are sensitive to different measures of
the corporate tax burden. Investment undertaken
for production purposes reacts to the broader mea-
sure of effective average tax rates rather than to
the narrow measure of the statutory tax rate. This
is consistent with our discussion above. It is some-
what more difficult to explain why FDI in the ser-
vice category responds to changes in the statutory
tax rate,but not to changes in the effective tax rate.
Profit shifting is a possible explanation for this
observation. According to Devereux (1992), there
are two types of capital tax competition, competi-
tion for physical capital and competition for
(paper) profits. This allows multinational firms to
follow a two-step optimization strategy. In the first
step, the multinational firm deploys (most) physi-
cal capital and hence production activities in the
countries offering locational advantages, including
a good public infrastructure. In a second step, the
MNE can shift some of its taxable profits into a
country that offers a low statutory tax rate and
with which it maintains a nexus (though with per-
haps only a minimal capital base).12 Since no or lit-
tle physical production takes place in the country
to which profits are shifted, the decision involved
in this type of tax arbitrage depends only (or at
least primarily) on a comparison of the statutory
tax rates. In this setting the MNE can thus have
“the best of both worlds”, benefiting from location
advantages in the country of production while
transferring the economic rent of the investment to
a tax haven where its profits are only lightly
taxed.13 If this interpretation is relevant for the
FDI undertaken by German multinationals during
the last decade, then our empirical analysis sug-
gests that profit shifting has been an important
motive behind the choice of host countries for ser-
vice-related FDI.
Clearly, these results have to be interpreted with
care, especially because the analysis is based on a




Effective tax rate negative –
Statutory tax rate – negative
Market Size positive –
11 These countries are: Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
12 The traditional instrument to shift profits from one country to
another are transfer prices for intermediate goods traded between
the subsidiary and its parent. However, transfer pricing strategies
are limited by the arms-length principle which stipulates that
internal trade prices have to be set such that they resemble com-
mon market prices. Moreover, using transfer pricing strategies
requires that some production is carried out in both countries in
which the multinational firm operates. For these reasons, profit
shifting seems to have increasingly shifted to internal trade in ser-
vices, including payments for overhead services, royalties and
interest paid on intra-firm loans. See Mintz (2001) for a detailed
discussion.
13 See Haufler and Schjelderup (1999) for a theoretical analysis of
this scenario.because there may be other structural differences
between the two categories that we cannot account
for with our set of control variables. However, the
basic result that service-related FDI reacts much
more strongly to changes in the statutory tax rate
than to changes in the effective average tax rate
has so far proven to be robust with respect to
changes in the precise specification of the empiri-
cal model. Moreover, the results for non-tax vari-
ables, in particular market size, also tend to con-
firm that traditional location advantages are
important only for FDI of the production type, but
do not matter for FDI that falls in the service cate-
gory (see Table 2). This adds additional support to
the presumption that some types of FDI are rather
independent of the real variables of the host econ-
omy, and locational choices are made primarily in
order to minimize the worldwide tax burden of the
multinational firm.
Conclusions 
A large number of recent empirical studies have
confirmed that high taxes in a potential host coun-
try tend to deter FDI, and some first “consensus
estimates” for the elasticity with which aggregate
FDI responds to tax incentives have been derived.
In this report we have argued that future empiri-
cal work has to go one step further and try to
understand the complex interrelationships that
exist between individual elements of potential
host countries’ tax systems and sector- or activity-
specific FDI flows. We have reported on two sets
of findings showing that (i) investments in differ-
ent sectors respond with rather different elasti-
cities to tax incentives and (ii) FDI undertaken
for different purposes will respond in qualita-
tively different ways to specific tax incentives,
such as a low statutory tax rate or generous depre-
ciation allowances.We believe that further empir-
ical work at a disaggregated level is needed in
order to help governments devise tax policies that
do not deter foreign direct investment while at the
same time ensuring that host countries get a fair
share of the location rents that multinational
firms can earn in the integrated European mar-
ket. The most important precondition for further
research are improvements in data availability,
including more detailed data on FDI stocks and
flows, but also more adequate data on other loca-
tion factors, such as public infrastructure or
labour costs.
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